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Supreme Court of the United States 
 
Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, 136 S.Ct. 1288 
(2016). 
 
The Federal Power Act (FPA) vests in the FERC the 
exclusive jurisdiction over interstate electricity sales; 
the FERC uses an auction to ensure wholesale rates are 
“just and reasonable.” The FERC’s auction ensures a 
stable capacity price for any new generator’s first three 
years but also requires a new generator to bid capacity 
at or above a certain price unless the generator can 
prove that costs actually fall below the minimum. 
Maryland, concerned that the FERC system does not 
promote new electricity generation within the state, 
enacted its own program to provide subsidies to new 
generators on the condition that the generator sell into 
the FERC auction. Competitors of Maryland’s new 
electricity generators filed a lawsuit to invalidate 
Maryland’s subsidy scheme under the Supremacy 
Clause. Maryland’s scheme required new generators to 
enter into a twenty-year stable pricing contract where 
Maryland would pay the difference between the 
guaranteed contract price and the auction price. The 
Fourth Circuit held that Maryland’s scheme intruded on 
FERC authority to set rates, standing “as an obstacle to 
the [. . .] objectives of Congress.” The Supreme Court 
affirmed, but limited its holding to Maryland’s specific 
program rather than conjecturing about other measures 
a state may or may not take to encourage energy 
development—“So long as a State does not condition 
payment of funds on capacity clearing the auction, the 
State’s program would not suffer from the fatal defect 






BP America Prod. Co. v. Colorado Dep’t of Revenue, 
No. 12SC996, 2016 WL 1639829 (Colo. 2016).  
  
A natural gas producer challenged the decision of the 
Colorado Department of Revenue (“CDOR”) denying 
certain deductions associated with the transportation 
and processing of natural gas. At issue is the “cost of 
capital,” which refers to the rate of return that could 
have been earned had the same money been put into 
different investments of equal risk. The Court of 
Appeals found that cost of capital is not deductible. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that 
deductions for transportation, manufacturing, and 
processing costs are appropriate, and therefore cost of 
capital is deductible.  
 
City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil, 2016 CO 28.  
 
An oil and gas association brought suit against a city 
requesting declaration and permanent injunction 
related to the city’s fracking moratorium that 
prohibited operators from fracking or storing fracking 
waste in the city. The case presented a question of 
whether state law preempts the city’s fracking 
moratorium. The Supreme Court of Colorado held 
that fracking is a matter of state and local concern, so 
the city’s moratorium is subject to preemption by 
state law. The Court held the city’s five-year 
moratorium on fracking and the storage of fracking 
waste operationally conflicts with the effectuation of 
state law, i.e. prevents operators who abide by the 
Commission’s rules and regulations from fracking 
until 2018 and impedes the effectuation of the state’s 
interest in efficient and responsible development of 
oil and gas resources. Accordingly, the moratorium 
was preempted by state law.  
 
City of Longmont v. Col. Oil & Gas Ass., 2016 CO 29 
(Colo. 2016).  
 
A city banned fracking and the storage and disposal 
of fracking waste within city limits. An industry 
association sued, seeking injunction enjoining the 
city from enforcing the local ordinance because it 
conflicted with Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation 
Act (Act). Home-Rule Cities have the authority under 
the state constitution to supersede state laws within 
the city’s jurisdiction that conflict with the city’s 
charter. That power, however, solely applies to 
matters of local-concern. When the charter conflicts 
with state law on a matter of statewide or mixed-
state-and-local concern, the state law preempts the 
charter. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
found that the conflict was a matter of mixed-state-
and-local concern because subterranean oil and gas 
pools do not conform to any city’s boundaries thus 
having an extraterritorial impact and requiring 
statewide uniformity of regulation, but the city has 
authority over zoning land uses. Because the Act, 
which promotes maximum production, prevents 
waste, and protects owners with coequal and 
correlative rights, conflicts with the city’s ban on 
fracking, a process already heavily regulated to 
protect public health and safety and initially created 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss1/3
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Loughman v. Equitable Gas Co., LLC, 2016 PA Super 
71. 
  
Individual landowners contracted with an exploration 
company to lease land for hydraulic fracturing. The 
exploration company failed to find oil or gas on the 
land, so lessors sought the lease be terminated. Further, 
lessors sought termination of a sublease by the 
exploration company. The exploration company 
countered that the sublease did not sever storage or 
production rights. The trial court denied the 
landowner’s summary judgment motion to sever the 
production and storage rights of the sublease. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined 
that the lease clearly and unambiguously permitted a 





Aery v. Hoskins, Inc., No. 04-14-00807, 2015 WL 
1237985 (Tex. App. Mar. 30, 2016).  
 
Surface and mineral estate interest owners of three 
tracts of land brought action against interest holders in 
two other tracts seeking declaratory relief based on 
competing claims to royalty interests in said tracts. The 
cause of action arose from three siblings’ agreement to 
pool and share royalties on three separate tracts of land. 
The Court of Appeals was asked to determine whether 
an undivided royalty interest held by one sibling in the 
other siblings’ tracts included in the pool became an 
appurtenance and passed with conveyance of the land. 
The Court of Appeals determined that because there 
was a pooling agreement, each sibling held an 
undivided royalty in the pooled unit. In addition, the 
court held that the siblings’ interest conveyed by 
general warranty deed should not include an undivided 
interest in the tracts belonging to his other two siblings.  
 
Haider v. Jefferson Cty. Appraisal Dist., No. 09-14-
00311-CV, 2016 WL 1468757 (Tex. App. Apr. 14, 
2016). 
 
Mineral owners and the city of Beaumont disputed 
whether the pooling of minerals resulted in the owners 
of the tract at issue owning minerals within the city’s 
tax boundary. Under Texas law, the lease language 
determined whether pooling grants to mineral owners 
of a tract within the unit a legal interest in the 
minerals located elsewhere in the unit. When a lease 
contains language that prevents a cross-conveyance 
of the lessor’s minerals to others who own minerals 
in the pooled unit, the lessor cannot own a percentage 
of the minerals associated with the other tracts in the 
unit. The Texas Court of Appeals held that the trial 
court should have denied both parties’ motions since 
the relevant mineral lease was not filed in support of 
either motion to establish whether a cross-
conveyance of minerals could occur.  
 
Samson Lone Star LP v. Hooks, No. 01–09–00328–
CV, 2016 WL 1019217 (Tex. App. Mar. 15, 2016). 
 
Lessor entered into an oil and gas lease containing 
“Offset Obligations,” which created a 1,320 foot 
buffer zone around the leased premises. If the 
lessee drilled into the buffer zone, he must either 1) 
commence drilling an offset well with due diligence, 
pay the lessor compensatory royalties, or 3) release 
the offset acreage. The lessee began drilling on a 
pooling unit outside of the buffer zone, but the 
lessee’s Railroad Commission filings showed that 
the directional well would bottom out within the 
buffer zone. The lessor agreed to pool fifty acres of 
his lease into the lessee’s pooling unit relying on the 
lessee's assertion that the second well would need to 
be outside the buffer zone and lessee's misleading 
plat created and filed in lessor's name before lessor 
consented. Subsequently, the lessee drilled the 
second well within the buffer zone. The lessor sued 
the lessee for fraud. The Court of Appeals of Texas 
held that there was only enough evidence to support 
$17,461,162.57 of fraud damages based on the 
compensatory royalties and late fees that would have 
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Curry v. Pondera Cty. Canal & Reservoir Co., 2016 
MT 77. 
 
A landowner filed a complaint against a water provider 
alleging interference with water rights. The Supreme 
Court of Montana held that the controlling principle of 
Montana water law is beneficial use, which is 
determined by intent, contemplated use, and actual use. 
The provider put the water to a beneficial use by 
providing water for sale and issuing shares of stock up 
to its allowed maximum acreage; the Water Court had 
incorrectly determined the provider’s rights were 
limited by the actual acreage irrigated by its 
shareholders. Additionally, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the lower court’s decision to grant the provider a 
service area rather than a place of use based on 
historically irrigated lands. The Court further found that 
the water was not beneficially used in a certain area 
prior to 1973 since evidence proved the area was either 
not included in the project or the provider’s lack of 
issuances of stock to water users in that area equated to 
nonuse; thus, the Court excluded that location from the 
service area. Finally, the Court affirmed the tabulation 
of claims without a volume determination since the 
decision by the Water Court to limit a water right by 
volume discretionary. 
 
In re Eldorado Coop Canal Co., 2016 MT 94. 
  
The senior water rights holder to the Teton 
River obtained the rights of three others and sought to 
obtain more, totaling eight claims. Upon objection of 
those claims, the Water Master limited the acre-feet per 
year for each claim, allowing a total of 10,350 acre-feet 
per year. The Water Court denied the Water Master's 
volume quantification. Instead, the Water Court set the 
total volume quantification at 15,000 acre-feet per year. 
The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the Water 
Court’s ruling, finding that 1) evidence supported the 
maximum volume determination, 2) the Water Court 
had the right to assign one combined maximum total 
instead of four individual maximums, and 3) the senior 
holder had acquired seventy-five inches of irrigation 











Jackson v. Groenendyke, No. 67289, 2016 WL 
1381495 (Nev. 2016).  
  
At issue in this case are water rights to an unnamed 
spring that had been improved with piping and 
crossed a number of properties. Aggrieved parties 
filed exceptions to the final order of the State 
Engineer, which determined that properties to the 
south and east of the water had vested rights in the 
spring. The Court affirmed that the State Engineer’s 
findings were not clearly erroneous. In addition, the 
Court held that certain parties are entitled to limited 
access for repairs because said repairs arise out of the 





Fox v. Skagit Cty., No. 73315-0-I, 2016 WL 1438377 
(Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).  
  
Property owners were denied a building permit 
because they failed to obtain an adequate and reliable 
source of water for their proposed home. The owners’ 
only source of water was a well located on their 
property, which was in hydraulic continuity with the 
Skagit River. The instream flow rule prohibits the 
exercise of water rights when the minimum flow 
requirements are not met for the Skagit River — a 
regular occurrence. The owners argued that their well 
was exempt because its use would not exceed 5,000 
gallons per day for single domestic use. The lower 
court denied the owner’s writ of mandamus. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed because the owners were 
subject to prior appropriations and the county had the 
authority to determine whether the well infringed 



















Foster v. Vilsack, No. 14-3887, 2016 WL 1399365 (8th 
Cir. Apr. 11, 2016).  
 
Property owner filed suit to challenge USDA 
determination that the owner’s farmland was protected 
wetland in accordance with the Food Security Act of 
1985 “swampbuster” provision, which deems 
individuals who convert wetlands ineligible to receive 
federal farm subsidies. USDA’s reports demonstrated 
that the property, located within the Southern Black 
Glaciated Plains Major Land Resource Area (SBGP 
MLRA), had 1) predominantly hydric soils, 2)  
 
 
saturation of groundwater at a frequency and duration 
sufficient to support hydrophytic vegetation, and 3) 
the ability to support hydrophytic vegetation under 
normal circumstances—the three controlling criteria 
for a wetland determination. The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the USDA. The owners 
had failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence 
that comparing color differences in pre-conversion 
aerial photographs to identify “wetness signatures” 
was erroneous. The owners also did not prove that the 
comparison site that the USDA used in favor of closer 
sites was improper; the USDA was free to reject closer 
locations that had been disturbed by cropping in favor 
of an undisturbed location within the SBGP MLRA. 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 
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For a more complete list of articles related to agricultural law, please consult the Agricultural Law Bibliography of 
the National Agricultural Law Center, http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/reporter/caseindexes/. This bibliography 
is updated quarterly and provides a comprehensive listing of agricultural law articles. 
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